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Abstract
This paper examines how to maximize contribution in public good dilemmas by arranging
people into homogeneous or heterogeneous subgroups. Past studies on the effect of homo-
geneity of efficacy have exclusively manipulated group composition in their experimental
designs, which might have imposed a limit on ecological validity because group membership
may not be easily changed in reality. In this study, we maintained the same group composi-
tion but varied the subgroup composition. We developed a public good dilemmas paradigm
in which participants were assigned to one of the four conditions (high- vs. low-efficacy;
homogeneous vs. heterogeneous subgroup) to produce their endowments and then to
decide how much to contribute. We found that individuals in homogeneous and heteroge-
neous subgroups produced a similar amount and proportion of contribution, which was due
to the two mediating effects that counteracted each other, namely (a) perceived efficacy rel-
ative to subgroup and (b) expectation of contribution of other subgroup members. This
paper demonstrates both the pros and cons of arranging people into homogeneous and het-
erogeneous subgroups of efficacy.
Introduction
Cooperation is vital to the welfare of organizations, communities, and states in the modern
society [1, 2] in promoting team work, conservation of natural resources, mitigation of green-
house-gas emissions, etc. A vast amount of theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to
understanding cooperation through various outlooks ranging from individual difference, cul-
tural, to evolutionary perspectives [2–10]. Although most of the traditional economic models
assume that all human beings are rational, self-interested agents, and do not prioritize social
goals, both laboratory experiments and real-life examples have indicated that people cooperate
to a non-negligible extent, e.g., [11, 12]. Many of those works study cooperation in the context
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473 July 31, 2018 1 / 18
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Yam PPC, Ng GTT, Au WT, Tao L, Lu S,
Leung H, et al. (2018) The effect of subgroup
homogeneity of efficacy on contribution in public
good dilemmas. PLoS ONE 13(7): e0201473.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473
Editor: Valerio Capraro, Middlesex University,
UNITED KINGDOM
Received: January 17, 2018
Accepted: July 16, 2018
Published: July 31, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Yam et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
in the Supporting Information files.
Funding: The project was funded by Hong Kong
Research Grants Council General Research Fund
2016 #14605416 (https://cerg1.ugc.edu.hk/) to
WA and GN. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to
publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
of public good dilemma (PGD), a situation where the whole group can benefit the most if all
its members contribute everything to the common pool, but the self-maximizing strategy is to
free ride and not to contribute anything [13, 14].
One important factor that was found to exert an influence on cooperation in PGD is the
group composition [15, 16]. One way to characterize the group composition is group homoge-
neity and heterogeneity (or group diversity), which are defined as the degree of similarity and
difference of attributes of group members respectively [17, 18]. Research on group homogene-
ity and heterogeneity can largely be classified into a social categorization perspective that
examines how ingroup/outgroup differences may disrupt the group processes; and an infor-
mation perspective that stipulates how diversity in knowledge and expertise may facilitate
group performance [19]. Past studies on organizational effectiveness have investigated the
effects of group homogeneity and heterogeneity based on attributes ranging from surface level
diversity (e.g., demographic characteristics of race, age, and gender) to deep level diversity
(e.g., attitude, personality, and values) [20], and such group homogeneity and heterogeneity
can have both positive and negative effects on organizational outcomes [21, 22]. This paper
focuses on the effect of subgroup homogenous and heterogenous distributions of efficacy on
contribution in social dilemmas.
Suppose we have a 12-person work team with six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy mem-
bers respectively, and they have to work on a specific task in a subgroup of three. How can we
split the team in order to maximize their contributions? On the one hand, we can split the
team into four homogeneous subgroups, with two subgroups each having three high-efficacy
members; and the other two subgroups each having three low-efficacy members. On the other
hand, we can also split the team into four heterogeneous subgroups, with two subgroups each
having one high-efficacy member and two low-efficacy members; and the other two subgroups
each having two high-efficacy members and one low-efficacy member. While previous experi-
mental studies have shown the effect of homogeneous distribution of efficacy on contribution
in PGD, e.g., [23, 24]; their findings may not be sufficient to address the above question. This
is because the way they manipulated the group composition of efficacy changed the total num-
ber of high- and low-efficacy individuals (i.e., the “total” efficacy) in a group. In our case, just
like most situations in daily life, the “total” efficacy of a group remains the same; we are stuck
with the people that we have. The only way to change group homogeneity is to divide group
members into subgroups. Therefore, the study reported in this paper aimed to examine
whether and how we can maximize group contribution by strategically changing the subgroup
composition in organizations, while keeping the total efficacy of group members unchanged.
In the following, we will first introduce the concept of “efficacy” that will be referred to
throughout this paper. We will then summarize some past research on the relation between
homogeneity of efficacy and contribution. After that, we will highlight the distinctive features
of the present study, and finally we will propose two potential mediators–perceived efficacy
and expectation of contribution–that could help explain the underlying mechanisms behind
the aforementioned relations.
Efficacy
Efficacy, criticality, and indispensability are similar constructs that have been used to describe
an individual’s impact on PG provision in a PGD, e.g., [25–29]. Particularly, Yu et al. [29] pro-
posed that Efficacy = Endowment × Efficiency, in which endowment is the resource that a per-
son can contribute while efficiency is the impact brought about by each unit of endowment.
For example, in a group project, a person is considered to have a high efficacy if he or she has
much time available for the group project (endowment) and can accomplish much work—per
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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hour spent (efficiency). Individuals’ efficacy varies with group size [30]. Keeping individuals’
endowment constant, as group size increases, the relative impact of each unit of endowment
(efficiency) decreases, so as efficacy. In our study, we kept the “total” efficacy of the group
unchanged, manipulating only the efficacy composition of each subgroup.
Homogeneity of efficacy and group contribution
Past studies that have examined the effect of group homogeneity of efficacy on contribution
focused on endowment heterogeneity (also termed as endowment asymmetry or resource
inequality, e.g., [31, 32]). These studies yielded mixed findings. On the one hand, Aquino et al.
[31] found that high resource inequality led to less cooperation in social dilemmas. They
argued that, under high resource inequality, people with fewer resources tended to free ride
because they perceived their contributions to be dispensable; while people with more resources
also tended to free ride because they expected others to do so as well. Rapoport and Suleiman
[33] also concluded from a step-level paradigm with provision threshold that heterogeneous
groups were less successful in providing PG than homogeneous groups. Similarly, Cherry et al.
[34] showed that contribution levels were significantly lower when groups had heterogeneous
rather than homogeneous endowments, irrespective of whether the endowments were deter-
mined by the performance of a task or were just randomly assigned. Fung and Au [24] also
found that both the symmetrically heterogeneous and the hegemonic heterogeneous groups
contributed less than homogeneous groups. In terms of proportion of contributions, Har-
greaves Heap et al. [35] showed that individuals with high endowment contributed propor-
tionally less in heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous groups.
On the other hand, there has also been research showing that heterogeneous groups con-
tribute more [23]. For example, heterogeneity of endowment was shown to have a positive
effect on aggregate contribution, but the effect was moderated by (a) whether communication
was allowed; (b) whether participants received complete information about the payoff; and (c)
whether the marginal return was the same for each member [36]. Another study showed that
when a best-shot PGD was determined by the highest contribution rather than sum of all con-
tributions, endowment heterogeneity resulted in better coordination as it provided a shared
expectation among group members [37].
Still, Warr [38] illustrated mathematically that the distribution of resources should have no
effect on the contribution of PG. In line with this prediction, Levati et al. [39] found that
homogeneous groups had similar contribution compared to heterogeneous groups. Table 1
shows the summary of these previous findings.
The present study
In the present study, participants role-played a member in a work team of a social enterprise
that comprised of six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy members. With the explicit knowledge
of this group composition, each participant was either assigned into a three-person homoge-
neous subgroup (i.e., either all high-efficacy or all low-efficacy members) or a three-person
heterogeneous subgroup (i.e., either two high- and one low-efficacy members or two low- and
one high-efficacy members). Participants were required to produce cell phone straps and
decide how much to contribute to the social enterprise.
There are two main objectives of the present study. The first is to examine whether and
how we can maximize contribution by strategically changing the subgroup compositions into
either homogeneous subgroups or heterogeneous subgroups while keeping the composition of
group members unchanged. With this goal in mind, our study is designed with two features
that distinguish itself from previous research. Firstly, we manipulated the homogeneity of
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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efficacy by varying the subgroup configurations. Although previous research also compared
the effects of homogeneity and heterogeneity of efficacy on contribution, they focused on the
effects with respective to groups rather than subgroups e.g., [23, 31, 34]. Their studies thus
manipulated the homogeneity of efficacy by changing the initial endowment of group mem-
bers. The second and a more important feature lies in how the interdependence of task out-
comes are implicated for subgroups as well as groups [40]. Past research compared the
contributions of homogeneous groups and heterogeneous groups by having the PG shared
among people within their own homogeneous or heterogeneous group only. In other words, a
participant’s outcome is independent of the contributions of other groups. In the current
study, however, all subgroups were nested within the same group. Participants, though stayed
in the subgroup, received the same PG that was jointly determined by all members in the
group, including members of other subgroups. Therefore, participants’ outcome was contin-
gent on the contributions of their own, as well as other subgroups.
The second objective of the present study is to understand the underlying mechanisms that
may explain why subgroup homogeneity can increase or decrease contribution. Specifically,
we test two potential mediators that are known to influence cooperation in social dilemmas,
namely perceived efficacy of oneself and expectation of contribution towards others.
Underlying mechanisms
Perceived efficacy. We distinguish between absolute efficacy and perceived efficacy. We
define absolute efficacy as the actual impact on the PG provision and perceived efficacy as the
personal belief about one’s impact relative to the affiliated group or subgroup. Specifically, in a
symmetric PGD with homogeneous endowment, the absolute efficacy of each individual
increases when endowment increases, but the perceived efficacy relative to group members
may not change because no one is comparatively more efficacious than the others. In the pres-
ent study, we randomly assigned participants into either high or low absolute efficacy
Table 1. Summary of studies of the effect of homogeneity of efficacy on contribution in public good dilemmas.
Authors Year Sample
size
Group
size
Provision
threshold
Fixed/Continuous
return
Major findings
Aquino et al. 1992 96 4 Yes Continuous Resource inequality led to decreased contribution.
Chan et al. 1996 75 3 No Continuous Endowment heterogeneity increased contribution for high, but not low degree
of heterogeneity.
Chan et al. 1999 72 3 No Continuous Endowment heterogeneity increased aggregate contribution, but the effect
was moderated by whether communication was allowed, whether participants
received complete information about the payoff, and whether the marginal
return was the same for each member.
Cherry et al. 2005 124 4 No Continuous Contribution levels were significantly lower when groups had heterogeneous
rather than homogeneous endowments, irrespective of whether the
endowments were earned or randomly assigned.
Cherry et al. 2013 192 4 No Continuous In a best-shot PG in which the provision level is determined by the highest
contribution instead of the sum of all contributions, endowment
heterogeneity resulted in better coordination.
Fung & Au
(Study 1)
2014 96 3 No Continuous Both the symmetrically heterogeneous and the hegemonic heterogeneous
groups contributed less than homogeneous groups.
Hargreaves
Heap et al.
2016 210 3 No Continuous Individuals with high endowment contributed proportionally less in
heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous groups.
Levati et al. 2007 328 4 No Continuous No significant differences in contribution between homogeneous and
heterogeneous groups.
Rapoport &
Suleiman
1993 60 5 Yes (vary across
conditions)
Fixed Heterogeneous groups were less successful in providing public goods than
homogeneous groups were.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473.t001
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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conditions. For simplicity, we use “high-efficacy individuals” and “low-efficacy individuals” to
refer to the participants being assigned to high and low absolute efficacy conditions,
respectively.
Perceived efficacy has been shown to be effective in inducing cooperation through enhanc-
ing a sense of social responsibility [41]. Research under the rubrics of efficacy and criticality all
point to the same conclusion that a person who perceives a larger impact on PG provision con-
tributes more. Beyond laboratory settings, perceived efficacy also influences various kinds of
organizational behaviors, including job performance [42].
Various factors can influence cooperation rate through efficacy. For example, a large group
size decreases cooperation drastically because it diminishes one’s perceived efficacy [43]. Kerr
[30] also demonstrated that people in a small group reported higher perceived efficacy and
hence cooperated more than those in a large group, despite the fact that their impacts on the
outcome were made objectively the same in both the small and large groups.
While subgroup configuration does not affect the absolute efficacy of individuals, it does
affect the perceived efficacy. Indeed, an individual’s perceived efficacy relative to the group may
be different from that relative to the subgroup. Intuitively, subgroup configuration may not
affect the perceived efficacy relative to the group because individuals should be aware of the
fact that the efficacy levels of other members in the group remain the same, regardless of the
subgroup composition. However, in terms of perceived efficacy relative to the subgroup, sub-
group homogeneity matters. Among high-efficacy individuals, those in heterogeneous sub-
groups shall perceive higher efficacy relative to the subgroup than those in homogeneous
subgroups, because they can make downward comparison with low-efficacy individuals within
the same subgroup. On the contrary, among low-efficacy individuals, those in homogeneous
subgroups shall perceive higher efficacy than those in heterogeneous subgroups because in
homogeneous subgroups everyone is of low-efficacy and there is no upward comparison. We
thus predict an absolute efficacy × subgroup homogeneity interaction effect on perceived effi-
cacy, and higher perceived efficacy relative to the subgroup will in turn lead to higher contri-
bution. Specifically, we hypothesize that high efficacy individuals will perceive higher efficacy
and will hence contribute more in heterogeneous subgroups than in homogenous subgroups,
whereas low efficacy individuals will perceive higher efficacy and hence contribute more in
homogeneous subgroups than in heterogenous subgroups (Hypothesis 1).
Expectation of contribution. Expectation of contribution refers to the amount that one
expects the other members to contribute. Expectation of others’ contributions affect our own
contribution. For instance, worrying that others are not going to contribute may induce fear of
being a sucker. One may also develop a sense of greed to free ride on others if we expect others
to contribute considerably [44, 45]. Furthermore, Pruitt and Kimmel’s Goal/Expectation
Hypothesis [46] states that, in addition to adopting a mutual goal of cooperation, developing
mutual expectation of cooperation is essential in enhancing cooperation. Indeed, previous
research demonstrated that cooperation increased when others were expected to cooperate
[47, 48].
A person with higher efficacy can potentially make a stronger impact on PG provision.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a person with higher efficacy will contribute more.
For expectation of group contribution, subgroup homogeneity should not affect the expecta-
tion of contribution towards the group because the group has a fixed configuration (e.g., six
high-efficacy and six low-efficacy members, as in the previous example). For expectation of
subgroup contribution, however, subgroup homogeneity matters. Specifically, high-efficacy
individuals in the homogeneous subgroups shall develop a higher expectation of subgroup
contribution than their counterparts in the heterogeneous subgroups. This is because all mem-
bers in high-efficacy homogeneous subgroups are of high-efficacy. On the contrary, low-
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups shall develop a higher expectation of sub-
group contribution than those in the homogeneous subgroups. This is because there is at least
one other high-efficacy member who is supposed to contribute a lot. We thus predict an abso-
lute efficacy × subgroup homogeneity interaction effect on expectation of subgroup contribu-
tion and a positive relation between higher expectation of subgroup and contribution.
Specifically, high efficacy individuals will expect other subgroup members to contribute more
and in turn they themselves will also contribute more in homogenous subgroups than in heter-
ogenous subgroups, whereas low efficacy individuals in heterogenous subgroups will expect
other subgroup members to contribute more and in turn they themselves will also contribute
more than their homogenous counterparts (Hypothesis 2).
Taken together, we propose a moderated mediation model in which subgroup homogeneity and
individual efficacy interact to affect contribution through two pathways, namely perceived efficacy
of oneself relative to subgroup and expectation of subgroup contribution towards others (Fig 1).
Method
Participants
A total of 336 undergraduate students (63% female) participated in this study that was pre-
sented as an individual and group decision making experiment. Participants received a flat-
rate of HK$50 (approximately US$6.5) for participation with a chance to earn an extra bonus
according to their performance. The bonus ranged from HK$111 to HK$368 (US$14–47) with
an average of HK$215 (US$28). This study was approved by the Survey and Behavioral
Research Ethics Committee of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Design
The experiment employed a 2 × 2 between-subject design with two levels of efficacy (high vs.
low) and two levels of subgroup composition (homogenous vs. heterogeneous).
Fig 1. Proposed moderated mediation model stipulating how subgroup homogeneity influences contribution.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473.g001
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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Procedures
Six students participated in each session that lasted for around an hour. After participants gave
their informed consent, the experimenter described the task scenario to them with visual aids.
The PGD was presented as a social enterprise scenario. Participants role-played a member of a
12-person group in which group membership comprised of the participants from the present
and the previous session. Their business was to produce cell phone straps using plastic beads.
The completed cell phone straps could be sold through either participants’ own private stalls at
a price of HK$5 per piece or the social enterprise at HK$15. The profit made by the social
enterprise was a PG which would then be shared equally among all 12 participants. The total
payoff for each participant was calculated as the sum of the profits earned from the private stall
and the social enterprise.
Participants were then presented with four examples illustrating the characteristics of a
PGD, such that everyone contributing a lot to the social enterprise is better than everyone con-
tributing only a little; however, they could earn the most if they contribute only a little while
others contribute a lot, and vice versa. The instructions stated clearly that there was no compe-
tition among participants and that there was also no competition between the social enterprise
and private stalls. Participants’ first task was to manually produce these cell phone straps
within a time limit. Their second task was to decide how many straps to sell through their own
private stalls (non-contribution) and the social enterprise (contribution), respectively.
The experimenter then demonstrated how to make the cell phone straps using beads—by
inserting beads into a plastic strap and then bending the end of the strap to fix the beads. Par-
ticipants were given one minute as a practice trial to make the cell phone straps and then to
make an allocation decision. Participants were also given a calculator to compute the profits of
themselves and of other members based on a hypothetical scenario. The experimenter checked
their answers to ensure that all of them understood the instructions clearly.
Afterwards, participants were told that as in everyday life, some people would have more
time and they could work more efficiently. In order to simulate these individual differences,
half of the 12 members in the social enterprise (i.e., the high-efficacy individuals) would be
allotted more time (six minutes) and higher working efficiency (requiring only three large
beads to produce a strap); whereas the other six members (i.e., the low-efficacy individuals)
would be allotted less time (three minutes) and lower working efficiency (requiring six small
beads to produce a strap) (Fig 2). S1 Appendix shows the instructions and illustrations of the
task presented to the participants.
The six participants in each experimental session that constituted half of the 12-person
social enterprise were assigned to two subgroups of three and were seated in two adjacent
rooms. They were told that the 12-person group was allocated into two different sessions and
each session was conducted in two separate rooms simply because of physical space con-
straints, in which we could not accommodate a 12-person group at the same physical location
simultaneously (cf. Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm [49]). Inside each room, the three partici-
pants were seated face-to-face but were three meters apart from each other, such that they
could not see others’ responses on the questionnaires. However, they could notice whether the
other participants were given six or three minutes to produce the straps, and whether they had
large or small beads. Because low-efficacy individuals had only three minutes to produce the
cell phone straps, they were asked to complete an English-to-Chinese translation for a cell
phone strap advertisement as a filler task while the high-efficacy individuals were still produc-
ing the cell phone straps in the remaining three minutes.
After participants had finished producing the cell phone straps within their allotted time,
they completed a short questionnaire and allocated their straps to the social enterprise and
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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their private stalls respectively by putting the straps into two separate compartments inside an
opaque box that other people could not see their allocation decisions.
Fig 2. Example of the cell phone straps to be made by high-efficacy individuals and low-efficacy individuals
respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473.g002
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473 July 31, 2018 8 / 18
After the game, participants completed questionnaires concerning their experiences regard-
ing the game. Full debriefing on the game was given to the participants upon completion of all
experimental procedures. In order to motivate participants to make the allocation decisions
seriously, one out of six participants from each session was randomly selected to receive a
bonus which was equal to his or her earning in the game. They were told that the profit made
by the social enterprise was calculated as the sum of the current and the previous session
because the two sessions belonged to the same social enterprise. S2 Appendix describes how
the bonus payments were computed.
Manipulation of efficacy
Efficacy was manipulated in terms of both endowment (amount of time allotted to produce
the cell phone straps) and efficiency (number of beads required to produce a strap) [29]. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned as either the low-efficacy or high-efficacy individuals. Low-
efficacy individuals were given three minutes to produce the straps and six small beads were
required to construct each strap; while high-efficacy individuals were given six minutes to pro-
duce the straps and each strap only required three large beads to construct.
Manipulation of subgroup homogeneity
Although all social enterprises were identically comprised of six high-efficacy and six low-effi-
cacy individuals, we systematically constructed subgroups of three people by assigning differ-
ent numbers of high- and low-efficacy individuals to produce cell phone straps in separate
rooms. There were two types of homogenous subgroups that consisted of either (a) three high-
efficacy individuals or (b) three low-efficacy individuals; and two types of heterogeneous sub-
groups that consisted of either (a) two high- and one low-efficacy individuals or (b) one high-
and two low-efficacy individuals.
Psychological measures
After participants had finished making the cell phone straps, they reported their perceived effi-
cacy and expectation of contribution before making the allocation decisions.
Perceived efficacy. Participants’ perceived efficacy relative to the subgroup was measured
by the item “Compared to other members in the room, please estimate the amount of straps
that you have made”, and participants’ perceived efficacy relative to the group was measured
by the item “Compared to the other 11 members in the social enterprise, please estimate the
amount of straps that you have made” on a 9-point scale with 1 = “The least in the group” and
9 = “The most in the group”.
Expectation of contribution. Participants also estimated the number of straps to be con-
tributed by the other two members in the same room (expectation of subgroup contribution)
and the other 11 members of the social enterprise (expectation of group contribution).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the number of straps produced, the num-
ber of straps contributed, and the proportion of straps contributed across different groups
respectively. The average number of straps produced, average number of straps contributed,
and average proportion of straps contributed by each individual were 23.3%, 10.0%, and
42.4%, respectively.
Subgroup homogeneity and contribution
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Effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap production and contribution
Before examining the effect of subgroup homogeneity on contribution, we tested whether the
number of straps produced was different for individuals in homogeneous and heterogeneous
subgroups. Welch’s t-test revealed no significant difference in strap production, t(331.38) =
-0.36, p = .72. In order to provide more convincing evidence that individuals in homogeneous
subgroups produced a similar number of straps as compared to that of heterogeneous sub-
groups, we followed the two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure proposed by Lakens [50] to
conduct an equivalence test on strap production. We set the upper and lower equivalence
bounds as Cohen’s d = ± .3. Power analysis showed that at least 145 participants per condition
are required to achieve a power of .95 for this equivalence bound. Our sample size (N = 336)
was adequate to perform this analysis. Using α = .05, the equivalence test was significant, t
(331.38) = 2.39, p< .01, implying that the difference in strap production between homoge-
neous and heterogeneous subgroups was sufficiently close to zero to be considered practically
equivalent [51].
Next, we tested the effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution to the PG. Welch’s
t-test revealed that there was no significant difference in strap contribution, t(333.10) = 0.72,
p = .47. In order to test whether homogeneous subgroups contributed a similar number of straps
as compared to that of heterogeneous subgroups, we also conducted the same equivalence test
on strap contribution. The equivalence test on strap contribution was significant, t(333.10) =
-2.03, p = .02, implying that homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups contributed similar
number of straps.
We also tested the effect of subgroup homogeneity on the proportion of straps contributed
to the PG. Welch’s t-test revealed that there was no significant difference in proportion of
straps contributed, t(332.54) = 0.55, p = .59. The equivalence test on proportion of straps con-
tributed was significant, t(332.54) = -2.21, p = .01, implying that homogeneous and heteroge-
neous subgroups contributed similar proportion of straps.
Table 2. Means (standard deviations) of the number of straps produced and contributed, and the proportion of straps contributed across different subgroup homo-
geneity and efficacy conditions (N = 336).
Subgroup Homogeneity
Efficacy Homogeneous Heterogeneous Overall
Low (N = 87) (N = 81) (N = 168)
Production 11.68 (1.63) 12.04 (1.56) 11.85 (1.60)
Contribution 4.60 (3.55) 5.16 (3.55) 4.87 (3.55)
Proportion 39.56% (30.20%) 43.05% (28.69%) 41.24% (29.45%)
High (N = 87) (N = 81) (N = 168)
Production 34.52 (3.72) 35.10 (4.31) 34.80 (4.02)
Contribution 16.07 (9.17) 14.10 (10.20) 15.12 (9.70)
Proportion 46.77% (26.56%) 39.89% (28.26%) 43.45% (27.53%)
Overall (N = 174) (N = 162) (N = 336)
Production 23.10 (11.81) 23.57 (12.01) 23.32 (11.89)
Contribution 10.33 (9.01) 9.63 (8.83) 9.99 (8.92)
Proportion 43.16% (28.59%) 41.47% (28.43%) 42.35% (28.48%)
Note. “Production” indicates the mean number of straps produced. “Contribution” indicates the mean number of straps contributed. “Proportion” indicates the mean of
individuals’ proportion of straps contributed.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473.t002
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In sum, individuals in homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups produced similar num-
ber of straps, and contributed similar number and proportion of straps to the PG.
Perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution as mediators
In order to test the proposed moderated mediation model stipulated in Fig 1, we performed a
multilevel moderated mediation analysis [52] using Mplus 7.31 [53]. Multilevel modeling was
employed because each low-efficacy or high-efficacy individual was nested within a homoge-
neous or heterogeneous subgroup. We assumed random effects in the model with efficacy as a
level-1 predictor, subgroup homogeneity as a level-2 predictor, perceived efficacy relative to
subgroup and expectation of subgroup contribution as two level-1 mediators, strap contribu-
tion as a level-1 dependent variable, and subgroup number as a cluster variable. The parame-
ters in the model were estimated using maximum likelihood (ML). Three responses were
excluded from this moderated mediation analysis because the participants did not indicate
their expectation of subgroup contribution. S3 Appendix shows the Mplus code of this
analysis.
Hypothesis 1 states that absolute efficacy moderates the effect of subgroup homogeneity on
perceived efficacy, such that high-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups will have a
higher perceived efficacy than those in homogeneous subgroups; whereas low-efficacy individ-
uals in homogeneous subgroups will have a higher perceived efficacy than those in heteroge-
neous subgroups. Supporting Hypothesis 1, we found that the effect of subgroup homogeneity
on perceived efficacy relative to subgroup was significantly different for high-efficacy and low-
efficacy individuals, b = 3.19, p< .001, 95% CI [2.24, 4.13]. High-efficacy individuals in hetero-
geneous subgroups had higher perceived efficacy than those in homogeneous subgroups,
b = 1.52, p< .001, 95% CI [0.93, 2.10]; low-efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups
had higher perceived efficacy than those in heterogeneous subgroups, b = -1.67, p< .001, 95%
CI [-2.41, -0.94] (Fig 3). Hypothesis 1 further states that there would be a moderated mediation
effect in which subgroup homogeneity and efficacy interact to affect perceived efficacy relative
to subgroup, which in turn mediate the effect of subgroup homogeneity on contribution. For
high-efficacy individuals, the conditional indirect effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap
contribution through perceived efficacy as a mediator was significant, b = 1.13, p< .01, 95%
CI [0.35, 1.91], such that high-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups had higher per-
ceived efficacy and hence contributed more straps. For low-efficacy individuals, the condi-
tional indirect effect was also significant, b = -1.24, p = .01, 95% CI [-2.19, -0.30], such that
low-efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups had higher perceived efficacy and hence
contributed more straps. The index of moderated mediation [54] was significant, b = 2.37, p<
.01, 95% CI [0.79, 3.95]. These results supported Hypothesis 1 that perceived efficacy was a
mediator of the effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution, and that the mediating
effects were in opposite directions for high-efficacy and low-efficacy individuals.
Hypothesis 2 states that absolute efficacy moderates the effect of subgroup homogeneity on
expectation of subgroup contribution, such that high-efficacy individuals in homogeneous
subgroups will have a higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in heteroge-
neous subgroups; whereas low-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups will have a
higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in homogeneous subgroups. Support-
ing Hypothesis 2, we found that the effect of subgroup homogeneity on expectation of sub-
group contribution was significantly different for high-efficacy and low-efficacy individuals, b
= -21.76, p< .001, 95% CI [-27.30, -16.22]. High-efficacy individuals in homogeneous sub-
groups had a higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in heterogeneous sub-
groups, b = -12.83, p< .001, 95% CI [-16.98, -8.69]; low-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous
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subgroups had a higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in homogeneous sub-
groups, b = 8.92, p< .001, 95% CI [4.82, 13.03] (Fig 4). Hypothesis 2 further states that there
would be a moderated mediation effect in which subgroup homogeneity and efficacy interact
to affect expectation of subgroup contribution, which in turn mediates the effect of subgroup
homogeneity on contribution. For high-efficacy individuals, the conditional indirect effect of
subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution through expectation of subgroup contribution
as a mediator was significant, b = -4.32, p< .001, 95% CI [-6.33, -2.31], such that high-efficacy
individuals in homogeneous subgroups had higher expectation and hence contributed more
straps. For low-efficacy individuals, the conditional indirect effect was also significant,
b = 3.00, p< .001, 95% CI [1.37, 4.64], such that low-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous sub-
groups had higher expectation and hence contributed more straps. The index of moderated
mediation was significant, b = -7.33, p< .001, 95% CI [-10.31, -4.34]. These results supported
Hypothesis 2 that the expectation of subgroup contribution was a mediator of the effect of sub-
group homogeneity on strap contribution, and that the mediating effects were in opposite
directions for high-efficacy and low-efficacy individuals.
Fig 3. Perceived efficacy relative to subgroup across different conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473.g003
Fig 4. Expectation of subgroup contribution across different conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201473.g004
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As an exploratory analysis, we tested a similar moderated mediation model in which the
two mediators (i.e., perceived efficacy relative to the subgroup and expectation of subgroup
contribution) were substituted by perceived efficacy relative to the group and expectation of
group contribution, respectively. None of the moderated mediation effects were significant.
These null results further demonstrated that it was the subgroup-level variables but not the
group-level variables that affected the contributions to the group.
Discussion
This study investigated whether we can maximize contribution through manipulating sub-
group homogeneity in PGD that the whole group shared the same PG. Our results suggested
that splitting group members into homogeneous or heterogeneous subgroups can concur-
rently enhance and reduce contribution through two different mechanisms. Consider the
high-efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups, they had a lower perceived efficacy rela-
tive to subgroup than those in heterogeneous subgroups, which led them to contribute less.
However, they had higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in heterogeneous
subgroups, which led them to contribute more. The effects of perceived efficacy and expecta-
tion of contribution hence counteracted each other and resulted in similar amounts of contri-
bution for high-efficacy individuals. Similarly, low-efficacy individuals in homogeneous
subgroups had a higher perceived efficacy, but lower expectation of contribution than those in
heterogeneous subgroups. The effects of perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution
again counteracted each other and resulted in similar amounts of contribution for low-efficacy
individuals. Hence, it appears that perceived efficacy and expectation of cooperation nullified
each other, helping to explain why homogeneous subgroups contributed to the same extent as
heterogenous subgroups did.
In an organization, it is common to divide workers into different subgroups to work on a
specific task. Oftentimes, members of a subgroup have different levels of efficacy. Our results
suggest that different strategies may be needed to motivate high- and low-efficacy workers to
contribute to the organization. High-efficacy workers, who supposedly have a higher perceived
efficacy, may expect other low-efficacy workers to contribute only a little, resulting in their
reluctance to contribute more. Hence, interventions should focus on changing their expecta-
tion of the contribution of other members, for instance, by convincing them that all members,
regardless of their levels of efficacy, are equally committed to the organization. On the con-
trary, low-efficacy workers may expect other workers to contribute considerably more, mean-
ing that they may see themselves to be less critical to the organization. Hence, interventions
should focus on increasing their perceived efficacy, for instance, by emphasizing that their
strengths and uniqueness are valuable to and have critical impacts on the organization.
The negligible difference between groups composing of homogeneous subgroups and
groups composing of heterogeneous subgroups should not be surprising after all. Research in
work group diversity has long been reporting mixed findings, e.g., [19, 55]. On the one hand, a
social categorization or identity related perspective would advocate that homogeneous groups
are better because having members of similar characteristics promotes a positive affective state
such as stronger group identity, cohesiveness, and trust. On the other hand, an information
processing or decision-making perspective argues that heterogeneous groups are better
because members with diverse backgrounds promotes positive cognitive state of differences in
knowledge and expertise, resulting in better decision making. Our work nicely demonstrates
that different emergent states like perceived efficacy and expectation of cooperation can nullify
the effects of each other as a result of the interaction between group diversity and member
characteristics (i.e., subgroup configuration and absolute efficacy in the current study).
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In this experiment, participants made their contribution decision based on their number of
straps produced. This effort task–manufacturing cell phone straps–to determine their endow-
ment was similar to other public good experiments that examined the “house money effect”:
comparing endowments “given” by the experimenter versus endowments “earned” by the
players. These experiments determined endowments by asking participants to crack walnuts
[56], answer Graduate Management Aptitude Test questions, e.g., [57], or stuff letters into
envelops [58]. We anticipated that through random assignment of participants to experimental
conditions, heterogeneity in endowments (due to differences in ability in manufacturing cell
phone straps) would be unsystematic random errors that affected both homogeneous and het-
erogenous subgroups similarly. We understand that this “earned endowment” manipulation
adds another layer of heterogeneity. However, we believe that the heterogeneity arising from
the “earned endowment” manipulation is not a confounding factor but instead it provides eco-
logical validity; unlike other experiments in which endowments were fixed. Nonetheless, we
examined how the effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution could be confounded
by strap production. We found that individuals in homogeneous subgroups produced similar
number of straps as compared to those in heterogeneous subgroups. Furthermore, the effect of
subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution remained non-significant even after controlling
for strap production, F(1, 333) = 1.36, p = .24. We can therefore rule out the possibility that
one type of subgroups may have produced more straps than another type of subgroups that
have affected strap contribution.
Due to physical space limitations, we conducted each experimental session with six partici-
pants only instead of twelve participants, which was the group size of the social enterprise.
However, we reiterated various times during the experiment that the social enterprise was
comprised of 12 participants. In addition, written descriptions of the task scenario presented
in a large font size posted on the wall, which also stated that their group consisted of six high-
efficacy and six low-efficacy members, were clearly visible to the participants throughout the
experiment. During the practice trial, we also asked participants to make estimates and com-
putations regarding the other 11 participants in their group. Their answers to the practice exer-
cise were checked by the experimenter and further explanation was given to clarify any
misunderstandings. We are confident that participants understood clearly that it was the
12-person group, but not the 3-person group in their room nor the 6-person group in that ses-
sion, that shared the PG.
There are several limitations in our study. Our moderated mediation analysis identified
perceived efficacy relative to subgroup and expectation of subgroup contribution as two medi-
ator variables. However, we are aware that such a “measurement-of-mediation” design does
not imply causation between the mediators and the dependent variable [59]. Particularly, one
may argue that the cause-and-effect relation between expectation of contribution and contri-
bution may be unclear, because it is also possible that an individual who chooses to contribute
a lot may be susceptible to a false consensus bias that others will also contribute a lot [60]. We
attempted to minimize this effect by measuring the participants’ expectation before they made
a decision on contribution. Furthermore, this effect presumably would not influence the inter-
action effects between efficacy and subgroup homogeneity, such that it should not have posed
a significant impact on the validity of our results.
While homogeneous groups are conceptually simple and unambiguous in the sense that all
members have the same efficacy, our treatment of heterogeneity, however, could have been
overly simplified. The concept of group heterogeneity is complex because there are numerous
qualitatively different distributions of group composition. Our heterogeneous subgroups
belonged to the type of a “minority belief” distribution according to DeRue et al. [61]. It is dif-
ficult to assert how our findings may be generalized to other types of heterogeneous
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distributions, for instances, the bimodal distribution (equal number of high- and low-efficacy
members), the fragmented distribution (all members having different efficacy [61]), or even a
hegemony distribution [24]. Future research shall examine the robustness of our results across
different subgroup compositions.
Past findings about the effect of group homogeneity of efficacy on contribution have been
mixed. Our study showed that perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution are two
mechanisms that can counteract the effect of homogeneity of efficacy on contribution. It is
possible that certain factors in past experimental designs, including the presentation methods
of PGD scenarios, the existence of a provision threshold, the group size, and the payoff struc-
ture, etc., can make either the effect of perceived efficacy or expectation of contribution more
salient, which in turn causes either the homogeneous or heterogeneous group to contribute
more. Because past studies did not measure the perceived efficacy and expectation of contribu-
tion of the participants, future research can fill in the gap by investigating how these factors
may influence the effect of homogeneity of efficacy on contribution and their respective
mechanisms.
While we are cautious not to over-generalize our findings theoretically and empirically
because of our relatively narrow operationalization of group heterogeneity and the specific
subgrouping manipulation that was based on isolation in physical space, our findings are use-
ful in showing how subgrouping according to efficacy levels of individuals can have both
advantageous and detrimental effects at the same time on contribution in mixed-motive
situations.
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